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Right in the Home: Feminist Theoretical
Perspective On International Human Rights
Arati Rao

*

In this article, I would like to extend the method and substance of
Western feminist theoretical critiques of national legal systems to the
field of international human rights. I use the issue of domestic violence,
including marital rape, to test the responsiveness of the human rights
framework to women's concerns. I am informed by the insights feminists
have gained regarding rights-based legal approaches in my assessment of
the value of the international human rights consensus for women. In
emphasising the tensions inherent in the rights-based approach, I want to
highlight various problematic epistemological assumptions and ontological
slippages in international human rights discourse, to argue for the urgent
need to reconceptualise human rights. This article highlights the main
themes of my larger book project on feminist theory and human rights.
In India, as anywhere else, even the gross under reporting of violence
against women cannot mask the magnitude and frequency of the crime.
The pressures brought to bear on the victim, as well as her internationaliseli
constraints, make the reporting of violence difficult. Where the victim
survives and. lodges a complaint, the insufficient and often crimereinforcing response of the selectively interventionist state makes a
mockery of her desire for justice. Long-existing patterns of violence
against women have become more deeply entrenched, and new forms of
systematic
abuse have emerged as ghastly accompaniments
to
modemisation.
The example of dowry harassment, often resulting in murder, is only
one of several kinds of violence in the Indian home that illustrate the
interlocking relationships between gender, ideology, socio-economic
structures, and me patriarchal state. In dominant gender ideology, the
criminal nature of dowry harassment is muddied by a number of cultural
formulations,
particularly
of femaleness
and the family, which
circumscribes a world in which a woman's worth lies in direct relation to
the amount of her dowry. For example, the definition of the woman as
•
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simultaneously a facilitator of wealth (when she brings dowry into her
in-laws' household) and an economic liability (when her presence requires
an accompanying dowry to offset her worthlessness to parents and inlaws alike), is representative of the mixed signals sent out by the dominant
gender ideology - signals which the woman herself is encouraged to
appropriate in her understanding of duty, humility, sacrifice, service and
the like.
There are various grounds on which domestic violence such as dowry
harassment can be condemned and ended; the assertion of the woman's
rights is one approach that I would like to discuss. Like marital rape,
dowry harassment too often receives the criminal protection of notions
of familial roles and special obligations. In the following pages, I will
examine the oppression and errors inherent in general formulations of
"the family", and argue for changes in international perceptions of
women's rights, if we are to successfully address violence against women
in the home.
I

Summary of Argument

The widely-discussed androcentrism of the concept of human rights
in its historical evolution and its contemporary forms has generated
particularly serious difficulties for the recognition of women's rights.
One important conceptual obstacle to gender justice is the notion of the
division of society into public and private spheres. The acceptance of
this notion pervades human rights discourse and activity, and undergirds
the human rights focus on the public sphere. Since the two spheres are
distinctly gendered, and unequally weighted by definition, it is difficult
to conceptualise violations of women's rights in the private sphere in a
fashion that is coherent as well as consistent with the language used to
describe violations in the public sphere. The issues of domestic violence
and abuse, particularly marital rape, bring to a head the philosophical
inconsistencies that are internal to the international consensus on human
rights. The explicit normative privileging of the legally-recognised
heterosexual family unit in international documents, such as the United
Nations Declaration of Human Rights (1948), leaves unproblematised
some of the most egregious human rights violations against women:
those that occur as part of certain activities recognised as exclusively
familial, and consequently are, by association, consonant with the
definition of the institution of the family. The twin human rights
assumptions of separate social spheres, and of the normatively privileged
status of the family, rely on a mistaken notion of.power as identifiable,
quantifiable, and predominantly employed by the state. This mistake
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leads to further errors in identifying the locus of power, its direction and
force, and its agents. In this approach, "domestic crime" becomes an
oxymoron. Consequently, issues like marital rape place the conceptual
framework of contemporary human rights under a strain so heavy that
women-specific abuses may never be completely redressed unless and
until the private realm is recognised as a legitimate area of human rights
concern at the highest level, and is problematised as the crucial site of
struggle for women's rights.
In expanding upon these points, I shall address the following four
questions. What kinds of human activity are viewed as the legitimate
scope of international human rights discourse? If some kinds of activity
generally receive consideration before others, on what grounds are the
priorities justified? How much room, if any, exists for the assertion of
human rights claims in the lower-priority areas of human activity? What
form are these claims permined or compelled to take in their demand for
redress?
In the following pages, I demonstrate that the epistemological
foundations of the concept of human rights interact with some distinctly
normative claims about different areas of human activity, to create a
high1y~charged atmosphere in which a gender-specific claim from women
tends to give a shock to the system rather than get succor from it.

n

Knowledge-Power Relationships

Feminist discussions of the androcentric nature of knowledge, and
feminist critiques of the relationship between knowledge and social power,
are valuable in assessing the limitations of some aspects of human rights
discourse, particularly when they command a high degree of international
consensus.1 Certain androcentrlc realities form the backdrop against which
my arguments unfold. These include firstly, the historical development
of the concept of rights in the West in the service of certain subgroups in
society (adult propertied male citizens) rather than of society as a whole;
See generally JEAN BETIIKE ELSHTAIN, PUBUC MAN, PRIVATE WOMAN:
WOMEN IN SOCIAL AND POrmCAL THOUGHT (1981); CAROL GILUGAN,
IN A DIFFERENT VOICE: PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY AND WOMEN'S
DEVELOPMENT (1982); SANDRA HARDING, THE SCIENCE QUESTION IN
FEMINISM (1986); AUSON JAGGAR, FEMINIST POrmcs
AND HUMAN
NATURE, (1983); GENEVIEVE LLOYD, THE MAN OF REASON: 'MALE' AND
'FEMALE' IN WESTERN PHILOSOPHY (1984); Spike V. Peterson, "Whose
Rights? A Critique of the 'Givens' in Human Rights Discourse," Ij AL TBRNA llYBS
303 (1990); ELlZABE11I V. SPELMAN, INESSENTIAL WOMAN: PROBLEMS
OF EXCLUSION IN FEMINIST THOUGHT (1988).
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the subsequent appropriation of rights language by one oppressed group
after another to the point at which the concept today purportedly applies
to all human beings; the dominance of men in the drafting, refinement,
interpretation, ratification, and implementation of international human
rights; the late emergence of a widespread feminist effort to address
gender-specific human rights abuses in women's lives.
The success of rights-based strategies in combating a variety of abuses
is indisputable. Indisputable, too, is the attraction of rights language to
many victims of oppression. Yet, rights as a concept, and as an approach,
has come under fire from several directions, most notably from feminists.
For example, the legal feminist thinker Ann Scales, extends the feminist
critique of the Western philosophical cannon to attack the primacy of the
rights approach in law when she writes :
The rights-based side of things, for all its grand abstraction,
describes a pretty grim view oflife on the planet. It treats individuals
in society as isolated nomads, as natural adversaries who must each
stake out his own territory and protect it with the sword! shield
mechanism of "rights". This model of aggression is half of what is
required for holocaust. 2
At the same time, one must not be seduced by such stark depictions
of rights-based individualism in its extreme form. Countering such
critiques are feminist legal scholars like Frances Olsen, whose cautionary
note below reminds us of the gendered oppression lurking behind the
anti-individualistic alternative of "community":
For many years women were forced into unequal and oppressive
"community" under the control first of their fathers and then of their
husbands ... Men force community upon women when they make
sexual advances to coworkers and subordinates or pester women
strangers with unwelcomed conversations. A rapist may believe he
is seeking community with his victim, especially if she is his wife
or social friend. 3
Olsen goes on to suggest a way out of the unhelpful oppositional
dichotomy of individual-community by linking both aspects of human
2

3

Ann C. Scales, "The Emergence of Feminist Jurisprudence: An Essay" 95 YALE
LAW REVIEW 1391 (1986).
Frances Olsen, "Statutory Rape: A Feminist Critique of Rights" 63:3 TEXAS LAW
REVIEW 387,393 (November 1984).
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existence in a mutually infonning and sustaining relationship.
The "women's rights" that we should support are an expression of
the social practice of allowing women to resist forced community.
The "bourgeois individualism" critique of rights is mistaken to the
extent that it opposes this social practice. The critique is correct to
the extent that it accepts the social practice but criticises a particular
understanding of its underlying basis. The distinction is important;
the social practice that allows women to resist forced community is
itself the result of collective political activity.4
Such a carefully-articulated distinction is very helpful in our search for
concrete strategies to end domestic violence. Olsen's view emerges
from an understanding of the law as neither wholly "male" nor steadfastly
"anti-female". For critics like Olsen, the law is a complex, uncoordinated,
contradictory, contextualised phenomenon, which has been imbued by
patriarchal interests with the self-serving, false qualities of objectivity,
rationality, abstraction and unity. This view of the law explains the
coexistence of legal refonn and legal victimisation. Such sensitivity to
the epistemological complexity of institutional and personal relationships
permits women to insist on immediate legal redress of their concerns,
even as they demand a reconceptualising of gender issues in the law.
In international human rights circles, the issue of domestic violence
against women has been muddied by' the interventions of patriarchal
ideology and practices. Globally, the husband's access to the wife's
body for disciplinary and sexual purposes is generally acknowledged as
consonant with the definition of marriage, thereby complicating any
acknowledgement of wife-beating and marital rape as gender-specific
crimes. Further, the assault by one privileged individual on another lessprivileged, in an institution specifically defined as relational and
communal, complicates the framing and assertion of an individualistic
claim. After all, legal personhood is not universally guaranteed to a
wife; in many societies, she is subsumed under the husband's legal
person. Even where the legal standing of the wife as an individual is
allowed, the tidal waves of judicial practices and social nonns usually
overwhelm her claim. Feminist activists have begun to demand that
international pressure be brought to bear on countries that perpetuate this
global pattern of abuse, and that the problem be addressed as a human
rights violation at the highest international level.
Political theorist Jack Donnelly observes that "one typically has direct
4

Id. at 394.
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recourse to human rights claims only where legal or other remedies seem
unlikely to work or have already failed ... In fact. the special function of
human rights virtually requires that they be claimed precisely when they
are unenforceable by ordinary legal or political means."s Given that "all
rights claims are a sort of 'last resort' ," he reminds us that "claims of
human rights are the final resort in the realm of rights".6
However, what if the courts of first, as well as last resort do not,
indeed cannot, recognise your human rights claims?
What if the
conceptual failures at the local level are replicated at the international
level, whether they are failures of recognition of human rights or of
addressing the violations thereof? What if the epistemological foundations
of a community's unfair legal standards and social arrangements are
reiterated in international laws and agreements? What if neither the existing
conceptions of human rights, nor the normative understandings of human
behaviour, serve the interest and well-being of significant numbers of
people? What is the validity of a human rights approach if these people
are readily identified as a group, such as "women", with particular needs
and vulnerabilities, in some areas of concern, but not all?
Evidence of the worldwide increase in abuses particular to women's
well-being is so alarming that existing theoretical analysis of a rightsbased legalistic approach must be extended immediately to the
international rights community. For example, the patriarchy-enhancing
"sameness" and "difference" principles, which the feminist legal theorist,
Catharine MacKinnon, has identified in United States law, may be seen
to be reiterated in content, as well as intent, in United Nations' declarations
on human rights.7
Let me illustrate this "gender blindness" with the example of the
definition of torture. The Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel,
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (1984), recognises the
integrity of the individual qua individual, and makes no reference to any
gender-specificity in the purpose and practice of torture :
For the purposes of this Convention, the term "torture' means any
act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental,
is intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes as obtaining
from him or a third person information or a confession, punishing
,
6
7

JACK DONNELLY, UNIVERSAL RIGHTS IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 13
(1989).
Id.
See generally CATHERINE A. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED:
DISCOURSES ON UFE AND LAW (1987).
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him for an act he or a third person has committed or is suspected of
having committed, or intimidating or coercing him or a third
person, orfor any reason based on discrimination of any kind, when
such pain or suffering is inflicted by or at the instigation of or with
the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person
acting in an official capacity. It does not include pain or suffering
arising only from, inherent in or incidental to lawful sanctions.8
Amnesty International's
deficient:

definition in its "Report on Torture" is equally

Torture is the systematic and deliberate infliction of acute pain in
any form by one person on another, or on a third person, in order to
accomplish the purpose of the former against the will of the latter ...
It can be safely stated that under all circumstances, regardless of the
context in which it is used, torture is outlawed under the common
law of mankind. This being so, its use may properly be considered
to be a crime against humanity.9
Such gender-blindness is perplexing, given the vast body of feminist
research that depicts the ways in which states themselves have developed
a special agenda in the torture of women. This has been achieved by
manipulating social factors that are specific to women's daily lives, such
as religion, gender ideology, and social roles.lO
Complicating this "gender sameness" approach is the coexisting
"difference" approach, which recognises the particular circumstances of
our unavoidably gendered. human existence. The various documents
which address general issues of gender discrimination as well as particular
issues, such as trafficking in women, testify to the broad scope of this
principle. Amnesty International's recent report, "Women in the Front
Line", addresses human rights abuses that are particular to women, such
as rape, sexual abuse, and violence related to pregnancy and childbearing. 11
I would argue that the coexistence of these two approaches is uneasy

I Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treannent or
9

10

11

Punishment, 1984, Part I, Article 1.
AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL REPORT ON TORTURE, London: Gerald
Duckworth, 1973.
See Ximcna Bunster-Burotto, "Surviving Beyond Fear: Women and Torture .in
Latin America," in WOMEN AND CHANGE IN LATIN AMERICA (J. Nash and
H. Safa eds. 1985).
See WOMEN IN THE FRONT LINE: HUMAN RIGHTS-VIOLATIONS AGAINST
WOMEN, AN AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL REPORT, 1991.

Vol. I]

Right in the Home

69

at best, and counterproductive at worst Even as the concept of human
rights universalises, it obliterates; even where it acknowledges specificity,
it insists on retaining established frameworks of general conceptualisation
and analysis. Furthermore, all these documents restrict themselves to
abuses in which the state is a visible actor; they do not address violations
outside the state-citizen relationship.
However, many would argue that the emergence of discussion, and
even international documents, on hitherto-unproblematised issues from
the "private" realm sounds an encouraging note. The two examples most
often cited are the rights of the child and the rights of women. Let me
address one international document that has generated controversy despite
its blandness: the 1979 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination Against Women, 1979 (hereinafter CEDA W). Even
among legal scholars who have demonstrated interest in women's rights,
concern runs high regarding the interpretive extension of CEDA W into
the private sphere. For example, while acknowledging the "rampant"
discrimination against women in the private realm, Theodore Meron
cautions:
There is danger, however, that state regulation of interpersonal
conduct may violate the privacy and associational rights of the
individual and conflict with the principles of freedom of opinion,
expression, and belief. Such regulation may require invasive state
action to determine compliance, including inquiry into political and
religious beliefs. 12
In his argument against the "overbreadth" of the Convention, Meron
particularly notes the added potential for conflict between women's rights
and religious rights.
Offsetting this problematic acceptance of the primacy of alreadyexisting rights of already-privileged people, over progress for women, is
the critical appraisal of "culture" found in numerous feminist writings.
For example, MacKinnon points out that the concept of "culture" itself
needs to be unpacked to reveal its structuring patriarchal power relations.
In "Whose Culture? A Case Note on Martinez v. Santa Clara Pueblo
(1983)", MacKinnon places the U.S. Supreme Court's hands-off response
to a Native American woman's demand for gender justice in her tribe, in
the larger legal context of the Court's readiness to meddle in Native
American affairs when they involve other issues, such as land ownership,
11

lHEODORE MERON, HUMAN RIGHTS LAW MAKING IN lHE UNITED
NATIONS: A CRI11QUE OF INSTRUMENTS AND PROCESS 62 (1986).
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mineral rights, or foreign relations.13 MacKinnon also unmasks the
complicity of male tribal leadership with the patriarchal state, which
leaves a Julia Martinez with no hope of receiving justice either from her
community or from the state. In response to the Court's reading oftribal
"culture" into what feminists would call a discriminatory practice,
MacKinnon asks: "Is male supremacy sacred because it has become a
tribal tradition?"14
Of course, there is a growing body of feminist thinking that takes a
less radicalised view of the social construction of culture, in which minority
writers dominate. For example, the African American novelist, Toni
Morrison, in an essay entitled, "Unspeakable Things Unspoken: The
Afro-American Presence in American Literature", argues for a much
more ambiguous
and fluid relationship
between the otherwise
dichotomised roles of oppressor a."1.doppressed, in which there is a
mutually infonning and even transfonnative process of interaction. 15 From
this angle, women are involved in the construction of "culture", dominant
or any other kind, to some degree - the exact nature and extent of which
is the subject of feminist culture theory.
MacKinnon's analysis of Martinez gives the lie to Meron's fear of
invasive state involvement, a fear which is shared by many legal scholars
at the national, as well as international levels. Feminists have shown
this fear to be a classic case of straining to keep the stable door closed
long after the horse has bolted. State regulation of the "private" realm
has long had a resounding impact on notions of family, sexuality, home
and work.16

ill

The Sphere(s) of Rights

'Private' and 'public' derive from the common philosophical ancestor
of the rights-based approach: liberalism.
From the human rights
perspective, it would be easy to assume a logical alliance between liberal
ideology and feminist goals. As political theorist Carole Pateman points
MACKINNON, supra note 7, at 63-69.
Id. at 67.
U Toni Morrison, "Unspeakable TIllngs Unspoken: The Afro-American
Presence in
American Literature" 27:1 MICHIGAN QUARlERLY
REVIEW 1 (Winter 1989).
16 See generally
RENATE BRIDENTHAL, ATINA GROSSMAN, AND MARION
KAPLAN, WHEN BIOLOGY BECAME DESTINY: WOMEN IN WEIMAR AND
NAZI GERMANY (1984); Barbara Klugman, "The Politics of Contraception in
South Africa" 13:3 WOMEN STUDIES INTERNATIONAL FORUM 261 (1990);
Amina Mama, IIViolence Against Black Women: Gender, Race and State Responses"
32 FEMINIST REVIEW 30 (Summer 1989); NIRA YUV AL -DAVIS AND FLOY A
ANTHlAS, WOMAN-NATION-STAlE
(1989).
13
14
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out The roots of both doctrines lie in the emergence of individualism as
a general theory of social life; neither liberalism nor feminism is
conceivable without some conception of individuals as free and
equal beings, emancipated from the ascribed, hierarchical bonds of
traditional society.17
Pateman and others are quick to point out the variety of opinion within
the liberal camp itself on the nature of public and private, and the debatable
validity of the constantly-shifting boundaries between the two spheres.
However, even the slightest retention of the notion of different spheres
of human activity - and the retention in liberal and rights ideology alike
is far from slight -is open to the test of gender.
The separate spheres approach permits choices to be made between
the two realms, as well as within each realm, on the issues central to
liberal concerns, such as authority, freedom, rights, obligations. Now, in
the best of all possible worlds, the mere. existence of separate spheres
would not result in inequality or injustice. However, the historical
evolution of the separate spheres shows that they are unequally weighted
in values and expectations, as well as normatively gendered. Further,
despite all the tortuous arguments for the complementarity of the two
spheres, in reality the male governs in each.
Along with other critiques, feminist theory has generated a voluminous
txxly of literature on the relationships between gender, patriarchy, and
the state. Feminist analysis of the public-private distinction shows the
two spheres to be, in reality, "the two sides of the single coin of liberalpartriarchalism".18 In liberalism, the state's role in carefully creating and
strenuously maintaining the realm of the private is mystified; the state's
structuring presence is disarmingly disowned. This mystification of
reality is reinforced by the ideology of civil society which simply does
not acknowledge civil society's very real division into gendered spheres
of existence. As Nicos Poulantzas notes, "it is not the 'external' space of
the modem family which shuts itself off from the state, but rather the
state which, at the very time that it sets itself up as the public space,
traces and assigns the site of the family."19 Political theorist Zillah
Eisenstein adds : "The division between public and private life, when it
17

CAROLE PA'IEMAN, THE DISORDER OF WOMEN: DEMOCRACY, FEMINISM
AND POUTICAL THEORY 118 (1989).

II Id. at 122.
19

NICOS POULANlZAS,

STATE, POWER, SOCIAUSM

66 (1978).
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is identified, is spoken of as reflecting the development of the bourgeois
liberal state, not the patriarchal ordering of the bourgeois state".20 When
the very rights languages that governs the public realm eloquently excuses
itself from the private, analysis of the family as the site of struggle for
rights becomes even more urgent.
IV

The Family as the Site of Struggle

Feminist theoretical discussion of the patriarchal bridge connecting,
even as it attempts to separate, the two spheres suggests that analysis of
the family is prior and fundamentally pre-emptive of analysis of other
areas of human activity, such as the work place. This overturns the
conventional framework of analysis out of which the notion of rights has
emerged. Here, the model of human nature is constructed around the
denatured, dehistoricised, disembodied, disembedded, individual self. In
the seventeenth century, English political theorist Thomas Hobbes urged:
"Let us consider men ... as if but even now sprung out of the earth, and
suddenly, like mushrooms, come to full maturity, without all kind of
engagement to each other;"21 today, American philosopher John Rawls'
theory-building enteIprise is facilitated by the characterless creatures whose
search for justice begins behind a "veil of ignorance" about themselves
and each other.22 While these approaches do no exhaust the range of
rights thinking, they remain representative of the dominant strain of
model-building in the rights tradition.
The construction of a rights framework in which the individual qua
individual is the primary subject of inquiry, and which focuses on the
activities of this individual in certain areas of (his) life and not others,
relies on a false notion of the private realm. This construction bypasses
the reality of the patriarchal framework within which the "two spheres"
doctrine flourishes. In other words, the rights framework removes one
kind of human being from the unavoidable particularities of our biological,
relational, historicised, culture-bound, human existence and assigns
paradigmatic privilege to him, even as it relegates another kind of human
being to her paradigmatic secondary status. As Pateman observes, their
feminist insight "highlights the problem of the status of the 'natural'

20

21

22

ZILLAH R. EISENSTEIN, TIlE RADICAL FUTURE OF LIBERAL FEMINISM
223 (1981).
Thomas Hobbes, "Philosophical Rudiments Concerning Government and Society,"
in TIlE ENGUSH WORKS OF mOMAS HOBBES, VOLUME II, 109 (Sir William
Molesworth ed. 1966).
JOHN RAWLS, A TIlEORY OF JUSTICE (1971).
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sphere of the family, which is presupposed by, yet seen as separate from
and irrelevant to, the conventional relations of civil society". In reality,
"the sphere of domestic life is at the heart of civil society rather than
apart or separate from it".23
International consensus on the status of the family reifies these
problems in the context of human rights. Article 16 of the United
Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948) states:
1. Men and women of full age, without any limitation due to
race, nationality, or religion, have the right to marry and to
found a family. They are entitled to equal rights as to marriage,
during marriage and at its dissolution.
2. Marriage shall be entered into only with the free and full
consent of the intending spouses.
3. The family is the natural and fundamental group unit of
society and is entitled to protection by society and the
State. (emphasis added)
This formulation reappears in direct and indirect ways in subsequent
human rights documents. For example, the sentence emphasised above
is repeated in the United National International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights (1966), Article 23 (1); the "natural and fundamental"
clause is repeated in the United Nations International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (1966), Article 10 (1). Furthermore,
this particular definition influences virtually every single reference to the
family in all important international human rights declarations and
documents (e.g., maternity; child-rearing; children born out of wedlock;
marriage; divorce). While it is true that these carefully-worded documents
have emerged out of long periods of intense consultation, negotiation,
bargaining, and compromise, I suggest that even closer scrutiny from the
feminist viewpoint will reveal conceptual stumbling blocks that seriously
undermine the goals of the documents themselves. Let us look at what
is enshrined in these documents and what is left out, to assess their
implications for women.
There are several consequences of widespread international recognition
of a particular form of the social institution of the family. While arguments
can be made for the general value of such a form, as well as its drawbacks,
this article will focus on only those aspects of the notion that have
relevance for women's rights in the home.
Note the sentence from the Declaration, emphasised above. This is
23

PATEMAN,

supra note 17, at 132-133.
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the only place in the entire Human Rights Declaration where society and
the state are named as participants who are exhorted to take an active
role in maintaining a social practice or institution, and where "the power
of the state is invoked as a protective device".24 TIrls formal recognition
of the state's role, and formal demand for the deployment of state power,
in maintaining the legally-recognised heterosexual family unit is nothing
short of extraordinary, given that the person who is primarily identified
with the family, the woman, is not conceptually central to human rights
documents or discourse.
Fundamentally, since the 'two spheres' theory defines the family as
the woman's realm, her dissatisfaction with or departure from the family
becomes conceptually problematic (even before we acknowledge her
very real ideological and economic costs of leaving the family). When
human rights violations occur within the family, the consequences of
this particular definition of family as 'natural' and 'fundamental', as well
as of this exhortation to the state, are extremely serious.
In an abusive situation, gender inequality emerges as one of the
defining characteristics of this notion of the family. In the case of
domestic violence, the normative standing of the family becomes a weapon
to be used against the abused woman to assign responsibility and blame
(and it usually is). For example, the raped wife can be censured for
withholding the sexual access that is guaranteed the husband in many
definitions of marriage (and she usually is). Her claim may be declared
invalid in a legal system that relies upon this definition and consequently
denies the possibility of rape within marriage (and it usually is). Agents
of the state may be employed to send an abused woman back to the site
of her abuse, the family, to 'protect' its 'natural' form and maintain
family unity (and they usually are).
Of course, in reality, a disproportionately high number of women do
not enter, or cannot continue to live in this normative structure. Somehow,
despite the difficulty of economic survival in a world where every other
aspect of existence is unequally weighted along gender lines, many of
these women survive (along with many of their children). Given this
reality, the formal acknowledgement of this one normative notion of
'family' in international documents must be reassessed.
It could be argued that other formulations of 'family' (for example,
homosexual/communal) are not precluded by this definition, that-creative
interpretation is possible. I would counter by insisting that, since all
significant references to family pertain to this one notion, recognition of
Z4

Iohannes Morsink, "Women's Rights in the Universal Declaration" 13 HUMAN
RIGHTS QUARTERLY 229, 247 (1991).
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other notions of the family must be fought for and their diverse forms
named, not assumed.
With this in mind, we can arrive at a broader understanding of the
place of domestic violence in human rights discourse. The denial of
conceptual reality to violence in the family, alongside the affirmation of
the comprehensive rights of the husband over the wife, is part of the
warp and woof of the notion of family, with a long and deeply-entrenched
history in legislation, custom, and social practice.25 Despite
encouragement from law, religion, and culture to regard domestic violence
as a private act committed between individuals, which warrants
intervention from the state only in egregious instances, the evidence
clearly implicates the state as an active and influential participant at all
times. The man's inclination and ability to unleash violence on his
female partner must be situated in the wider contexts of permissible
behaviour and litigable acts.
V

The Case of Marital Rape

The issue of marital rape is a particularly strong test of the conceptual
readiness of human rights to remedy crimes against women. Sexual
assault within marriage is arguably the most mystified of abuses
perpetrated against women. To borrow one of the phrases that heralded
the women's movement in the United States in the 1960s, this is literally
'the problem that has no name'.26
The kind of rape recognised in international agreements itself has
been scarcely analysed outside feminist circlesY Human rights writers
who deploy notions of individual dignity and honour to condemn rape,
perpetuate the kind of rape ideology that shunts questions of responsibility
and instrumentality away from the patriarchal structure of society and on
to the victim's psychological state. Yogindra Khushalani does this in
applying the Civilian Geneva Convention, Article 3 (1949), and its
Protocols I and II, 1977.28 In Khushalani's approach, the indignity and
dishonour that raped women feel is never problematised in order to
understand exactly whose honour, dignity, autonomy, and property is
violated in a rape. Nor is it clear why the crime is primarily defmed in
SUSAN SCHECTER, WOMEN AND MALE VIOLENCE: THE VISIONS AND
STRUGGLES OF THE BATIERED WOMEN'S MOVEMENT (1982).
26 BETIY FRIEDAN, THE FEMININE MYSTIQUE 15 (1963).
n See SUSAN BROWNMILLER, AGAINST OUR WILL: MEN, WOMEN, AND
RAPE (1975).
28 See YOGINGRA KHUSHALANI, DIGNITY AND HONOUR OF WOMEN AS
BASIC AND FUNDAMENTAL HUMAN RIGHTS (1982).
25
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subjective psychological
terms. In keeping with the purview of
international human rights, Khusha1ani' s inquiry is restricted to mass
rape of women during armed conflict.
Given the narrow definitional and analytical focus on rape in human
rights discourse, it is not surprising that rape in marriage has remained
largely undiscussed. Legal, religious, and customary definitions of the
institution of marriage lay the ground for the conceptual acknowledgement
and legal admissibility of particular acts within marriage. Feminist
scholarship has generated a wide array of materials on the institutions of
marriage and the family, with critical analysis of their structuring
principles, such as: restricted or exclusive right to sexual access; lines of
transmission of property (including the human property of wives and
children); establishment of legitimacy, which must precede all claims
made on or against the parties to the marriage or family. As Pateman
observes, feminists "have shown how the family is a major concern of
the state and how, through legislation concerning marriage and sexuality
and the policies of the welfare state, the subordinate status of women is
presupposed and maintained by the power of the state."29
Diana Russell's influential study of rape in marriage in the United
States, demonstrates the conceptual and material difficulties in defining,
acknowledging, and addressing the issue.3O At one point, Russell argues
that certain forms of human interaction in which women are the victims,
such as domestic violence and marital rape, would qualify as torture. In
this light one could note that, since international debate has been generated
and agreement reached on human rights violations where the infliction of
pain is evident, the infliction of pain in marital rape, with its short term
as well as long term consequences that injure and dehumanise the woman,
should not be excluded on the ground that it occurs in the private realm.
The numbers of bodies broken and lives lost in reported domestic violence
alone are staggering; the numbers of survivors of sexual assault within
marriage very likely far exceed these. At a time when awareness and
acknowledgement of women's vulnerability to abuse is widespread
(CEDA W can boast of 110 signatories at the time of writing), the
international silence on the issue of domestic violence stands in thunderous
contrast to women's demands. The qu~stion is not: when will international
agreement be reached? The question is: why has it not been reached yet?
Another important area of conceptual error in human rights thinking
of women's issues is the notion of power that structures and prioritises
human rights concerns. As long as the context for a human rights
29
30

PATEMAN supra note 17, at 133.
See DIANA RUSSELL, RAPE IN MARRIAGE (1982, reprint 1990).
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violation is one in which power emanates as a force from a single
particular source, and is subsequently directed at one other entity, the
kinds of abuses that are supported by society-wide mechanisms of policing
and enforcement will be left in conceptual limbo. 'This is particularly
true of violations in the private sphere, where the abdication of
responsibility by the state is offset by the state-supported repression and
brutality of substitutes (the abusive husband who demands his "conjugal
rights"; the police who do not respond to the woman's complaints; the
legal system that does not define rape in terms consonant with the rape
victim's experience; the judge who is permitted by law to give the
husband custody of the very children whose safety is the woman's
concern).
If human rights are seen to be protected and violated through the
exercise of political power, and if only certain kinds of power fall within
the scope of international human rights activities, then nothing short of a
radical shift in the definition of power can permit any possible redress of
violations that occur elsewhere. Only by fresh conceptual associations
of knowledge, political power, and social practice can certain kinds of
violence, such as marital rape, be given a name, and can their indubitably
political nature he recognised.
VI

Lessons from Foucault

French philosopher Michel Foucault's theory of the politics of power
andlin social practice is particularly helpful in illustrating my argument
for a redefinition of powerY Foucault acknowledges the historicity of
social norms and the objects of their inquiry, unpacks the relational
aspects of social values such as freedom, delineates our participation in
the maintenance of regimes of social control, and radicalises our notion
of complicity in power. Critical feminist readings of Foucault range
from appropriation of his analysis to suspicion of its totalising potential. 32
With these critical interpretations as backdrop, I would like to explore
31

32

See generally MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE mSTORY OF SEXUAUTY, VOLUME
I: AN INTRODUCTION (R. Hurley trans. 1980); POWER\KNOWLEDGE:
SELECTED INTERVIEWS AND OTHER WRITINGS (C. Gordon ed. 1980);
DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH: THE BIRTH OF THE PRISON (A. Sheridan trans.
1979).
See generally Balbus, "Disciplining Women: Michel Foucault and the Power of the
Feminist Discourse," FEMINSIM AS CRITIQUE: ON THE POLITICS OF GENDER
(S. Benhabib & D. Cornell eds. 1987); Judith Buder, "Variations on Sex and
Gender: Beauvoir, Witting and Foucault," (S. Benhabib & D. Cornell eds. 1987);
Nancy Fraser, "Foucault on Modern Power. Empirical Insights and Normative
Confusion" 1 PRAXIS INTERNATIONAL (1981).
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further the value of Foucault's account for human rights.
One of the most influential aspects of Foucault's reflections on
modernity is his problematisation of power. His "genealogy" of modem
power historicises the form, nature, and agency of power as consonant
with social organisational patterns peculiar to modernity. Modem power
for Foucault is distinguished from pre-modem forms of power by virtue
of its development, characteristics, procedures, and sites. As political
theorist Nancy Fraser summarises, modem power is "local, continuous,
productive, capillary, and exhaustive".33 It emerged in a piecemeal fashion
through the development of various social institutions from the early
eighteenth century, such as hospitals, prisons, and schools.
These
"disciplinary institutions" developed and perfected a number of distinctive
strategies (organisation, discipline, and surveillance) to cope with the
unique challenge of controlling and policing large numbers of people.
For example, children were arranged in schoolrooms according to ability
and rank; patients were arranged in hospital spaces according to disease.
These institutions confronted issues of management and control well
before the state had to deal with these issues. The state in modem
politics could subsequently draw upon the tactics which these dispersed
loci of power had addressed first. Over time, the nature of the challenge
to, as well as the response from, these institutions came to characterise
modem politics and was incorporated into "global or macro strategies of
domination", as Foucault terms it.34
English philosopher Jeremy Bentham's model of the ideal prison,
the panopticon, exemplifies this development. One of its unique
characteristics was the unidirectional "gaze" of the surveillance authority,
which gave the inmates no clue as to their observability at any moment,
thereby compelling them to internalise the gaze and become their own
monitoring authority. Thus, the characteristics of pre-modem power violence, discontinuity, and sporadic application - were replaced by
modem power's deployment of technology and reason, scientific
observation, attention to minute detail, and the non-visible force of the
gaze. Power penetrated every nuan~e of the individual's daily thought
and deed like capillaries pervading a body, circulating constantly,
increasing through movement and incorporation, and transforming the
individual object of power to the point at which the individual policed
herself, thereby authorising her own complicity in the exercise of power.
Thus, Foucault showed that daily social activities, or what he called
~~ Id. Fraser at 276.
34 Id.
3' Fraser, supra note 32, at 272.

YoU]

Right in the Home

79

"micropractices", were the sites in which power was most enacted and
experienced.
Fraser comments that Foucault's insights into the nature of modern
power "have political significance in that they suffice to rule out some
rather widespread political orientations as inadequate to the complexities
of power in modern society".3s In their critical appraisal, Fraser points
out that Foucault "brackets" several important aspects of conventional
accounts of power in his analysis of the working of power, such as: the
account of power as state - or economy-centred; the contention that
ideology is the paramount mystifier; the belief that power is essentially
repressive. In support of Foucault's project, philosopher Judith Butler
comments that Foucault's "tactic, if that it can be called, is not to transcend
power relations, but to multiply their various configurations, so that the
juridical model of power as oppression and regulation is no longer
hegemonic".36
What can the human rights enterprise learn from Foucault's notion
of modern power? Let me suggest the following selective appropriations
and applications. First, we must acknowledge the complexity of power
in society, beyond the state-citizen dichotomy that governs human rights
work. Like the feminist slogan, 'the personal is the political', Foucault's
project problematises power at the conceptual level. Second, this
problematised concept not only saturates human existence, but also asserts
itself in a dynamic, relational fashion which implicates all as participants
in disciplinary mechanisms.
Foucault's theory shows the full range of the exercise of power, such
as the state's, far beyond its most visible manifestations.
Third, any
attempt at tracking the state's role in the management of individual lives
must make what look like detours, but actually are constituent elements
of the main path, into seemingly non-stale areas. Foucault's theory
invades conventionally 'private' activities to show their highly political
content. Fourth, the role of the state in mobilising a typical kind of
power and its agents cannot be separated from the specifics of oppression
as it is practiced at particular historical moments. The freedom of the
larger society is always relative to the lack of freedom of those who have
been defined as invisible, or as outside the public realm of freedom.
Indeed, as Terry Aladjem observes, "Foucault enjoins us to return to reexamine the conditions of confinement and discipline that shaped our
conception of freedom in the first place". 37
36
31
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When introduced into an analysis of domestic violence and marital
rape, my reading of Foucault's theory supports the case for fresh thinking
on the four questions raised earlier in the summary section of this article.
VII

Directions for Debate

The failure of the international rights community to break its silence
on the most frequent and egregious violations of women's rights cannot,
and indeed will not be allowed to continue. However, although women
have begun to make serious demands in international
meetings,
disagreements on strategy have not been ironed out. The two most
important issues run as follows:
First, it has been suggested that we extend existing documents like
the Discrimination
Against Women- Convention, through creative
interpretation and innovative application, to address domestic violence
and even marital rape. We must hope that, with sufficient education,
lobbying, publicity, and commitment, such rights claims can be asserted
as well as recognised.
This is a serious and popular argument. However, the very attempt
at extension is difficult to make, because it must run counter to the
philosophical and conceptual focus on a different sphere of human
existence, as discussed above. In addition, the task of interpretation lies
in the hands of the same classes of persons who restricted, or agreed to
restrict, the scope of human rights to the public sphere in the first place:
international lawyers, diplomats and government officials.
Creative
interpretation, and still less creative implementation, is not a reliable
strategy in the case of abuses in the private sphere. Furthermore, creative
extensions, despite all their cunning, will generate the same kind of
debate as the explicit naming of the crime. Therefore, the oft-stated
rationale for simply extending the Convention - to avoid the passion and
chaos that very likely will attend debates on, say, a Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Domestic Violence Against Women - is
mistaken.
Second, it has been argued that there are various forms and levels of
human rights activity. After all, social change continues to be effected
by a variety of means at local, national, and regional levels, regardless of
the legal status of asserted claims. Indeed, given the paramountcy of the
domestic sphere as the site of violence against women, perhaps a state's
resources may be deployed more favourably at the local level.
In response to thiri exhortation, I say the following: I agree that the
pervasiveness and social embeddedness of the crime must be addressed
at a11levels. However, international debate and formal recognition of
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rights violations in the private sphere would make a tremendous
difference.
Restricting the battle to local women' s groups and local
human rights organisations will only maintain the splintered. uncoordinated
nature of the struggle. Resources will continue to be scarce; information
will remain unshared or duplicated; wide-ranging strategies will not be
tested. Without international consensus and backing. funding will remain
in short supply and energy will continue to be diverted to small-group
survival. The argument regarding resource availability is bankrupt: As
my discussion of the public-private dichotomy has shown, the state already
had devoted vast resources to the maintenance of injustice in the private
sphere; the state must be pressured to mobilise these resources to more
productive ends.
In conclusion, I must insist that the problem is better understood as
one of conceptual contradiction rather than as strategic inadequacy. It is
imperative that human rights consensus and discourse, as they stand
today. problematise the areas that critical supporters. such as feminists.
have identified as contradictory and counterproductive. In this article. I
have tried to demonstrate that. despite unavoidable tension and resistance.
issu~s of domestic violence must be raised and debated with seriousness
and honesty. In the process. the problems that will emerge will point out
conceptual contradictions.
and possible dead ends. that must be
acknowledged and addressed. Only then can human rights make the leap
froin its present gains as a corrective practice for some. to a transformative
force for all.

